Assistant Professor
Bush School of Government and Public Service Texas A&M University
1034 Allen Building 4220 TAMU
College Station, TX 77843
United States
(979) 458-8032

Justin B. Bullock is an assistant professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service and a research fellow at the Institute for Science, Technology, and Public Policy at Texas A&M University. Bullock earned his PhD in public administration and policy with a specialization in public management and public policy from the University of Georgia in 2014, as well as a master’s in public administration and a bachelor’s in business administration, also from the University of Georgia. Bullock is a co-author of the first virtual issue of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JPART). He also co-authored “How (Not) to Solve the Problem: An Evaluation of Scholarly Responses to Common Source Bias,” published in JPART, and “Attitudes about Hard Work: A Global Perspective on the Beliefs of Government Employees” in the International Public Management Journal. Bullock has presented at conferences of numerous national and international organizations, including the Public Management Research Association, the Midwest Political Science Association, the Southern Political Science Association, the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, the European Group on Public Administration, the Academy of Management, and the International Health Economics Association.

Justin B. Bullock

Justin B. Bullock is an assistant professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service and a research fellow at the Institute for Science, Technology, and Public Policy at Texas A&M University. Bullock earned his PhD in public administration and policy with a specialization in public management and public policy from the University of Georgia in 2014, as well as a master’s in public administration and a bachelor’s in business administration, also from the University of Georgia.

Risk Management and Reducing Improper Payments: A Case Study of the U.S. Department of Labor

This report continues the IBM Center’s long interest in risk management with a specific focus on employing risk management strategies to reduce improper payments in the U S Department of Labor’s (DOL) Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. There is a long tradition of public management scholarship that has provided empirical support for the hypothesis that management matters for government performance. One specific management activity that has been growing in prominence in federal agencies over the last several years is risk management.